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Hein and the Goldilocks Principle
Maya Manian*
Two weeks into his presidency, George W. Bush issued an executive order establishing
the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI) to encourage
religious groups to provide federally funded social services.1 In particular, the OFBCI and its
corresponding centers in various executive agencies sought to help religious organizations obtain
federal grant monies by providing technical assistance to help them navigate the often byzantine
bureaucracy surrounding federal grant-making. 2 The OFBCI achieved its goal of increasing
federal grants to religious organizations, in part by funding workshops and conferences designed
to aid religious groups pursuing federal financing. 3 Concerned that the Bush Administration was
using taxpayer dollars to support religious activity, the Freedom from Religion Foundation
(FFRF), a Wisconsin organization that works to defend the constitutional principle of separation
of church and state, filed suit in federal court seeking to enjoin the activities of the OFBCI as
violative of the Establishment Clause. 4 FFRF asserted that it had taxpayer standing to challenge
the OFBCI program. 5
The Supreme Court, in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, barred the use of
taxpayer standing as a means to challenge executive expenditures that violate the Establishment
Clause. 6 Traditionally, the Court has not granted standing for plaintiffs asserting only
"generalized grievances" as opposed to an "injury-in-fact.", 7 Generalized grievances involve
8
plaintiffs suing solely as citizens concerned that the government is not following the law.
Federal taxpayers do not have standing to challenge government spending that they believe9
contravenes the Constitution, as these cases epitomize the assertion of a generalized grievance.
However, prior precedent, Flast v. Cohen, established an important exception to the rule against
taxpayer standing if government spending violates the Establishment Clause. 10 Flast's rule is
unique, "for no claim on the merits other than one brought under the Establishment Clause has
ever been permitted in a federal court by a plaintiff asserting taxpayer standing. 11 In Flast, the
taxpayer plaintiffs challenged a congressional appropriation for education that government
officials used to support parochial schools. 12 In Hein, the Court rejected the claim that executive
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1 See

Lauren S. Michaels, Recent Development, Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation: Sitting This One Out-

Denying Taxpayer Standing to Challenge Faith-BasedFunding,43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 213, 222 (2008).
2id.

31id.
4 Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 595 (2007).
5 Id. at 596.
6 Id. at 609-10.
7 See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).

9 See Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
10Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
11 See Carl H. Esbeck, What the Hein Decision Can Tell Us About the Roberts Court and the Establishment Clause,
78
Miss. L.J. 199,211 (2008).
12

See Flast,392 U.S. at 85.
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In What the Hein Decision Can Tell Us About the Roberts Court and the Establishment
Clause, Professor Carl Esbeck gives a clear and succinct account of the problem of generalized
grievances and the Establishment Clause. 14 Professor Esbeck's essay uses the Hein decision on
taxpayer standing as a lens to understanding the Roberts Court's substantive approach to the

Establishment Clause. Professor Esbeck argues that the Establishment Clause is structural in
nature, serving to "police the boundary between government and organized religion" rather than
to protect individual rights. 15 When violations of constitutional structure occur, such as violations
of separation of powers or federalism principles, typically "there will be some other government
branch eager to defend against the encroachment on its turf' that will be able to assert injury-infact standing. 16 In contrast, under the Establishment Clause, Professor Esbeck demonstrates that
government officials could disburse large sums of money aiding religion, but no individual
would have a particularized injury sufficient to assert standing to17 remedy the constitutional
violation-every taxpayer would have only a generalized grievance.
Therefore, Flast's exception to the rule against taxpayer standing is crucial for
preservation of the separation of church and state.18 As Professor Esbeck explains, without Flast,
Congress could appropriate money for religious schools or even to pay the salaries of religious
ministers, yet "no one would have standing to challenge such a law in federal court, which surely
strikes at the core of the American church-state settlement." 19 Professor Esbeck notes that the
Flast rule "enabled a more expansive judicial enforcement of the Establishment Clause." 20 So
why did the Court reject a similar exception to taxpayer standing when the executive spends
taxpayer dollars in support of religion, as the Bush Administration allegedly did through the
OFBCI?
13 Hein, 551 U.S. at 603-04.
14See Esbeck, supra note 11, at 203-11.
15Id. at 215. Of course, not all agree with this characterization of the Establishment Clause. See Hein, 551 U.S. at
639 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Establishment Clause protects the individual right of conscience and
therefore "every taxpayer can claim a personal constitutional right not to be taxed for the support of a religious
institution" as distinguished from a generalized grievance); see id. at 616 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the
Establishment Clause protects the individual right of "freedom of conscience").
16Esbeck, supra note 11, at 217. Professor Esbeck acknowledges that there are exceptions to this general principle.
See id. at 215-16 (noting that sometimes when structural violations occur there is no one who can assert injury-infact standing and sometimes there are cases of individuated injury-in-fact when the Establishment Clause is
violated).
17See id. at 217-18. Taxpayer standing is especially critical to obtaining judicial enforcement of the Establishment
Clause in cases involving government grants to religious organizations. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on
a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication,
2008 B.Y.U. L. REv. 115, 155-58 (2008) (arguing that in many cases challenging government financial support for
religion "taxpayers are the only conceivable plaintiffs because typically no one is injured by a decision to fund a
particular grantee").
18See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 153 ("Many religion-promoting acts by government create no obvious
material or personal injury and may be quite popular. The political branches thus will frequently have incentives to
violate the [Establishment] Clause. Without broad notions of justiciability in Establishment Clause cases, there is
reason to expect that the Clause would be significantly under-enforced.").
19Esbeck, supra note 11, at 212.
20
id.

In Hein, only three Justices agreed to uphold a distinction between legislative and
executive spending in aid of religion for purposes of Article III standing. Justice Alito's
controlling plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, held that
Flast should stand, but should not be extended to allow taxpayer standing to challenge
Establishment Clause violations by the executive. Justice Alito asserted that separation of powers
principles demanded the denial of taxpayer standing to individuals challenging executive
expenditures supporting religion, fearing that the executive would become subject to extensive
judicial oversight at the behest of all taxpayers. 2 1 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
argued vigorously that not only should taxpayer standing be denied in Hein, but also Flast should
be overruled.22 Justice Scalia scorned the plurality's distinction between legislative and executive
spending, arguing that it was "utterly meaningless" and would lead to "the sure promise of
engendering further meaningless and disingenuous distinctions in the future." 23 Professor Esbeck
acknowledges that the plurality's approach in Hein "operate[s] in the realm of logical
inconsistency," but nevertheless represents an appropriate "Goldilocks stance." 24 He argues that
the plurality took a measured "middle road" that properly
balanced the core constitutional values
25
powers.
of
separation
and
separation
of church-state
I would argue that Hein takes a middling course rather than a measured, thoughtful
middle course on Establishment Clause standing. The problem with Hein is not just logical
inconsistency. The Hein decision allows a blurring of the boundary between church and state by
rendering it more difficult to bring challenges to executive actions entangling the government
with religion. As Judge Posner explained, executive agencies could violate the Establishment
Clause through expenditures just as readily as the legislative branch, even through such extreme
actions as building their own houses of worship. 26 Justice Alito's plurality opinion claimed that if
the executive did engage in a "parade of horribles" involving direct financial support for religion,
"Congress could quickly step in." 27 However, the plurality's assertion ignores the possibility that
Congress may be a willing partner in the executive's Establishment Clause violations. 2 1 Other
Justices also remarked that Congress could manipulate the distinction drawn in Hein by
funneling financial support for religion through the executive branch.29 Moreover, as Justice
Souter noted, "fear that there will be many [lawsuits] does not provide a compelling reason,

21 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 610. In particular, the plurality expressed concern that "extending the Flastexception to
purely executive expenditures would effectively subject every federal action-be it a conference, proclamation or
speech-to Establishment Clause challenge by any taxpayer in federal court." Id.
22 See id. at 633 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, dissented. See id. at 637 (Souter, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 633 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
24 Esbeck, supra note 11, at 218.
25 id.
26 See Freedom from Religion Found. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 994-95 (7th Cir. 2006).
27
1Hein, 551 U.S. at 614.
28 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 154 ("[D]rawing a line between challenges to executive and legislative acts
may encourage legislatures to abdicate policy-making responsibility and to confer unjustifiably broad discretion
upon the executive branch whenever religion-promoting activity may be associated with a particular government

program.").

29 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 630 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the plurality opinion would lead to
"absurd" results such as denying taxpayer standing where Congress disbursed funds to religious organizations
through informal negotiations with the President rather than a discrete appropriation).

much less a reason grounded in Article III, to keep them from being heard. ' ,30 Hein reflects a
much more forgiving view of church-state separation that may leave Flastan empty shell.
Hein's logical inconsistency-essentially permitting the executive to "accomplish
through the exercise of discretion exactly what Congress cannot do through legislation"-is on
par with the well-documented incoherence in the entire line of precedent governing
Establishment Clause standing. 31 The chipping away at Flast may have more to do with
normative disagreements about where to draw the line on church-state separation than the
technicalities of standing doctrine. In other words, Flastand its convoluted progeny are likely the
consequence of32cloaking a debate about the meaning of the Establishment Clause in a debate
about standing.
So what does the Hein decision tell us about the two newest Justices' views of the
Establishment Clause? It may suggest, as Professor Esbeck proposes, that Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito intend to adhere to Flast and its resulting protection of church-state
separation. 33 Alternatively, Hein's middling stance on judicial enforcement of the Establishment
Clause may stem more from insufficient power to overturn Flast than from any commitment of
these two Justices to judicial minimalism or to separation of church and state. Likely, it made no
practical sense for the two newest Justices to rock the boat since they lacked Justice Kennedy's
critical fifth vote. 34 The Roberts Court has certainly not been reluctant to overturn long-standing
35
precedent when able, despite Chief Justice Roberts's claim to strive to be a minimalist judge.
Furthermore, Justice Alito's plurality opinion clearly leaves the door open to overrule Flast in a

31 Id. at 640 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting). Judge Posner also dismissed the notion that extending Flast to executive
expenditures supporting religion would necessarily lead to undue judicial oversight of executive officials at the
behest of taxpayers. See Chao, 433 F.3d at 995. Judge Posner's opinion emphasized that the FFRF had taxpayer
standing to challenge the OFBC1 program, not merely speeches by officials, and the fact that the OFBC1 "was an
executive rather than a congressional program does not deprive taxpayers of standing to challenge it." Id. at 996.
31Hein, 551 U.S. at 640 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 618-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(discussing inconsistencies between taxpayer standing precedents); see also Freedom from Religion Found. v. Chao,
447 F.3d 988, 989-90 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (describing
Establishment Clause standing precedents as "illogical" and "arbitrary").
32 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 136-37 (arguing that differing substantive interpretations of the
Establishment Clause implicitly animate the Justices' views on standing). Standing doctrine has long been criticized
as highly manipulable and as a tool used to further substantive policy agendas. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
Linkage Between Justiciabilityand Remedies--And Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REv. 633,
635 n.2, 688-89 (2006) (discussing the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts' use of justiciability doctrines to
further policy priorities); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
635, 650-51 (1985) (criticizing incoherence of standing doctrine generally and its covert use to express views on the
merits of legal claims).
33 See Esbeck, supra note 11, at 222-23.
34 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Kennedy Court, 9 GREEN BAG 2d 335, 345-46 (2006) (stating that "Kennedy was
and will continue to be the key fifth vote between the progressive and conservative wings of the Court").
35 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 836, 886 (2010) (overturning prior precedent
limiting corporate spending on political campaigns); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 171 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Court's decision to uphold the federal "partial-birth" abortion ban retreats from longstanding precedent requiring health exceptions to abortion restrictions). See also Jeffrey Toobin, Annals of Law: No
More Mr. Nice Guy, The Supreme Court's Stealth Hard-liner,THE NEW YORKER, May 25, 2009 ("His jurisprudence
as Chief Justice, Roberts said, would be characterized by 'modesty and humility.' After four years on the Court,
however, Roberts's record is not that of a humble moderate but, rather, that of a doctrinaire conservative.").

case that directly presents the question. 36 Notably, Justice Kennedy felt the need to write
separately to emphasize his view that Flast was decided correctly, an opinion that neither Chief
Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito joined. 3 7 Justice Scalia also remarked that only Justice Kennedy
"avowedly contends both that Flast was correctly decided and that [FFRF] should nevertheless
' 38
lose this case," a position he and the dissenters found "incomprehensible. "
Establishment Clause standing has long been a vexing area of the law because, in
numerous cases, an exception to the rule against taxpayer standing is necessary to make the
separation of church and state a meaningful constitutional principle. 39 Establishment Clause
protection "would melt away" in the many circumstances where no individual can assert
traditional standing to challenge government financing of religious activities, whether the source
of the financing is legislative or executive. 40 Although Flast still lives-for now-Hein's
Goldilocks approach does not feel "just right" as a means to maintain separation of church and

state.

36 For example, in discussing Flast,Justice Alito's opinion stated only that "we must decline this invitation to extend
its holding to encompass discretionary Executive Branch expenditures," not that Flastwas correctly decided. Hein,
551 U.S. at 609. The last section of the opinion also noted that the case before it did not require overturning Flast,
and since the decision is "[r]elying on the provision of the Constitution that limits our role to resolving the 'Cases'
and 'Controversies' before us, we decide only the case at hand"-implicitly suggesting that Flast could be
reconsidered another day when the issue directly presents itself. Id. at 615.
37 See id.at 616 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
31 Id. at 629 n.3, 636 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see id. at 641 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that
distinction drawn by the plurality between legislative and executive spending is "arbitrary and hard to manage").
39 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 119 ("Establishment Clause standing doctrines are looser than most, for the
prudential reason that the Clause would not be judicially enforceable if traditional Article 1IIrules applied.").
41 See Hein, 551 U.S. at 640 (Souter, J., dissenting).

